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Abstract:  
This paper outlines the socio-demographic, developmental, antecedent attack, attack 
preparation and commission properties of 115 mass murderers between 1990 and 
2014. The results indicate that mass murderer attacks are usually the culmination of a 
complex mix of personal, political and social drivers that crystalize at the same time 
to drive the individual down the path of violent action. We specifically focus upon 
areas related to prior criminal engagement, leakage and attack location familiarity.  
Whether the violence comes to fruition is usually a combination of the availability 
and vulnerability of suitable targets that suit the heady mix of personal and political 
grievances and the individual’s capability to engage in an attack from both a 
psychological and technical capability standpoint. Many individual cases share a 
mixture of unfortunate personal life circumstances coupled with an intensification of 
beliefs/grievances that later developed into the idea to engage in violence.  
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Shooting Alone: The Pre-Attack Experiences and Behaviors 
of U.S. Solo Mass Murderers 
 
President Obama began 2016 calling for a national “sense of urgency” to limit gun 
violence. This followed a series of high profile mass murder events. In total, twenty-
seven separate shootings killed four or more people in the United States in 2015. 
Some attacks were organized crime related. Some were terrorist related. Some were 
acts of domestic violence. Solo individuals acting upon personal grievances 
perpetrated others. This article is interested in the latter group of offenders. Utilizing a 
unique dataset of 115 solo mass murderers, we examine their socio-demographic 
characteristics and the antecedent behaviors they engaged upon prior to and during 
their attack planning and the attack itself.  
 
Previous research focused upon mass murder in a historical context (1), the offense 
location (2), victimology (3), motivations (4-5), public responses to mass shootings 
(6), cultural aspects of mass murder (7), and the psychology of mass murderers (8). 
Others provided empirical examinations of offender behavior of similar offender 
types. These include studies of adolescent mass murderers (9), lone-actor terrorists 
(10-13), individuals that attack or approach prominent public officials/figures (14), 
active shooters (15), school shooters (16-17) and comparisons between “lone wolf 
terrorists” and “deranged shooters” (18) and suicide bombers with various mass 
casualty shooters (19).  
 
This paper focuses upon an empirical examination of solo mass murderer behavior, 
with an aim of highlighting the trajectories of their violent ‘radicalization’ and how 
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these findings can be operationalized. The results are derived from the richest (in 
terms of sample size and breadth of variables) dataset of its type on mass murderer 
behavior.  
 
Data 
 
We developed a unique dataset that categorizes the socio-demographic, 
developmental antecedent attack, attack preparation and commission properties of 
115 mass murderers between 1990 and 2014. To reduce bias in the sample, we limit 
our focus to United States-based offenders. Despite the palpable rise in public anxiety 
following events such as Columbine, Aurora, and Sandy Hook, the fact remains that 
mass murder is an extraordinarily rare event in the U.S.  From 1976 to 2000, the 
percentage of murders that involved more than one victim ranged from 3% to 4% of 
homicides per year (20).  A review of the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports 
from 2000 to 2012 shows that the number of mass murders (four or more victims) was 
approximately one-tenth of one percent of all murders (excluding the 9/11 deaths).  
Nevertheless, perhaps because it occurs so infrequently but is so disturbing, few 
crimes receive more news coverage than mass murder (21). The level of available 
granular behavioral data is consequently far higher.  
 
To identify our sample, we first examined the academic literature on mass murderers 
and built an actor dictionary, producing a list of names that fit our criteria (see below).  
Next, we identified additional offenders through databases created by Mother Jones, 
USA Today and Mayors Against Illegal Guns.  Finally, we conducted searches on 
LexisNexis using specific terms and searched the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
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Uniform Crime Reports for each year of the relevant time period to find other 
offenders who meet our criteria. 
 
A pervasive problem with prior research on mass murder is the shifting definition of 
what exactly a mass murder is. Previous research focused on criteria like offender 
motive (22), the type of weapon used (22) and the number of wounded victims (5).  
Generally these criteria are not relied upon in the literature, perhaps because they 
appear to be arbitrary.  There is, however, general agreement that a mass murder 
involves multiple victims killed at one (or multiple but geographically close) 
location(s) over a relatively short period of time (3, 5, 22-23).  Nevertheless, there is 
less agreement about the minimum number of victims required to define a murder 
event as “mass”.  Some researchers use a threshold of two victims (24), others use 
three victims (5, 23), and still others use four victims (20-21).   
 
The definition used in this study is four or more victims (not including the offender) 
for the following reasons. First, four or more victims (not including the offender) is 
the demarcation line accepted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its 2005 
report: Serial Murder: Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives for Investigators, released 
after a meeting of experts in various fields relevant to the study of multiple homicides. 
This definition of mass murder was the result of considered reflection by the leading 
academics (criminologists, psychologists, forensic psychiatrists), and practitioners 
(state and federal law enforcement officials and prosecutors) brought together by the 
FBI for the specific purpose of clarifying issues related to serial and mass murder.  
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Second, where data is collected via open source research methods, the number of 
victims is an important determinant of media coverage of multiple murder events.  
Research suggests the attention given to any mass murder by the media is affected by 
certain factors, and high profile mass murders are significantly more likely to involve 
larger numbers of killed and wounded, stranger victims, public locations, assault 
weapons and workplace violence (2, 21). 
 
Third, practical considerations necessitated a threshold of four victims instead of 
three.  A review of the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports from 1976 to 1999 
reveals there are over three times as many cases of three victim homicides as there are 
four victim homicides (21).  Employing a mass murder definition of three or more 
victims would necessitate reducing the time span of the study from approximately 24 
years to at most eight years.  While that approach may be useful in future research, 
this study opts for the use of a greater time span which also matched the time span 
utilized in previous data collection endeavors (11). 
 
We narrowed our parameters to only include those mass murderers who acted alone 
and without direction or support. In keeping with that same principle, the study also 
excludes state-sponsored as well as gang, terrorism and organized crime related 
incidents.  Also, solely domestic attacks are excluded, as these are frequently treated 
separately in the literature and appear to have a distinct genesis (19, 25). 
 
The codebook built upon one utilized previously in a study of lone-actor terrorists 
(11). The variables included in the codebook span socio-demographic information 
(age, gender, occupation, family characteristics, relationship status, occupation, 
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employment, etc.), antecedent event behaviors (aspects of the individual’s behaviors 
towards others and within their day-to-day routines), event specific behaviors (attack 
methods, who was targeted) and post-event behaviors and experiences (claims of 
responsibility, arrest/conviction details, etc.). Data were collected on demographic 
and background characteristics and antecedent event behaviors by examining and 
coding information contained in open-source news reports, sworn affidavits and when 
possible, openly available first-hand accounts. The vast majority of sources came 
from tailored LexisNexis searches. Information was gleaned from relevant documents 
across online public record depositories such as documentcloud.org, biographies of a 
number of mass murderers and all available scholarly articles. 
 
Three independent coders coded each observation separately. After an observation 
was coded, the results were reconciled in two stages (coder A with coder B, and then 
coders A+B with C). In cases when three coders could not agree on particular 
variables, differences were resolved based on an examination of the original sources 
that the coders relied upon to make their assessments. Such decisions factored in the 
comparative reliability and quality of the sources (e.g., reports that cover trial 
proceedings vs. reports issued in the immediate aftermath of the event) and the 
sources cited in the report.  
 
The below results outline the prevalence of the various behaviors detailed in the 
codebook. For the results that follow, where possible, we do report or distinguish 
between missing data and ‘no’ answers but it should be kept in mind that the likely 
result is that ‘no’ answers are substantially undercounted in the analysis. Unless 
otherwise stated, each of the figures reported below are of the whole sub-samples 
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(n=115). There is precedent for this in previous research on attempted assassinations 
of public figures, fatal school shootings and targeted violence affecting institutions of 
higher education and lone-actor terrorists (11, 14, 17, 26).   
 
Results 
 
First, we analyze the socio-demographic characteristics of the offenders themselves. 
The aim here is not to create an offender ‘profile’. Given the broad spectrum of 
potential motivations and idiosyncratic ideologies across a low base rate of offenders, 
such an endeavor is conceptually and empirically problematic and also holds little 
practical relevance for investigative purposes. Instead, our goal is to provide better 
insight into what variables we see universally across all crimes including mass 
murderers, and what offender characteristics appear to be particularly prominent 
within the mass murderer sample.  
 
Males heavily dominate the sample. Only three females made our inclusion criteria.  
In October 2006, Valerie Moore (by then an already convicted and released murderer) 
killed 12 and injured a further 31 after intentionally setting fire to a mattress outside 
the hotel room of an individual she recently argued with. Also in 2006, Jennifer San 
Marco returned to her former workplace at a Postal Service office and shot and killed 
six before turning the gun on herself. During a February 2014 tribal meeting to 
discuss her possible eviction, Cherie Lash Rhoades fired from two handguns and 
wielded a butcher knife, killing four. The wider crime and terrorism literature also 
shows that males are also far more likely to engage in a wide range of violent and 
illegal behaviors (see 12 for a full explanation). Indeed, males account for 93.2% of 
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all sentenced prisoners in state or federal prisons according to a 2010 U.S. 
Department of Justice report (27). In effect, the relatively low preponderance of 
females in the sample is nothing extraordinary. 
 
The average educational attainment within the same was relatively low. Only 24% of 
the sample had some experience of university education, with 11% finishing an 
undergraduate degree, and 4% finishing some form of graduate degree. This was 
generally reflected in later career achievements. 28% of the mass murderers were 
unemployed, 33% worked in the service or administrative sectors and 5% were 
professionals.  
 
A high percentage the mass murderers were single (43%) whilst smaller numbers 
were married (17%) or divorced (13%).  
 
Previous Criminal History 
Much academic work on volume crime shows that a large predictor of future 
engagement with criminal and illicit behaviors is whether the individual has a 
previous history of criminal or illicit activities (28). Previous research has shown that 
offenders with prior convictions (including child molestation, robbery, or multiple 
probation sentences) are more likely to engage in a spree of homicidal offending (29). 
Fein and Vossekuil’s (14) study of individuals who took part in or at least attempted 
to take part in an assassination of a public figure illustrated that 56% of the sample 
had one or more arrests for a non-violent offense while 20% had one or more arrests 
for a violent offense. 
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Our sample shows similarly high figures.  43% possessed a previous criminal 
conviction. Of this sub-sample, 67% served time in prison indicating the seriousness 
and/or prolific nature of their offending. Offences included failure to pay child 
support, drug possession, forgery, counterfeiting, drink driving, unauthorized use of a 
motor vehicle, burglary, armed robbery, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, criminal 
damage to property, theft, cruelty to animals, aggravated harassment, drug dealing, 
gun possession (whilst being a felon), assault, child endangerment, domestic violence, 
sexual battery, gross sexual imposition, sex with a minor, assault with a firearm, 
drive-by shooting, and second degree murder. We therefore see a very wide range of 
illegal activities and certainly no concentration of one crime type that we can identify 
as an escalatory “trigger” for subsequent behavior into mass murder. 
 
Other Distal Factors 
There are a number of other behaviors providing an understanding of the offender’s 
behavioral background. 63% experienced long-term stress. Examples of this include: 
academic frustration stemming from learning disorders; difficulty maintaining 
employment and failure in business ventures; disabling injuries from automobile and 
work accidents; long-term financial debts; a range of mental health issues including 
depression, bi-polar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder; being a victim of 
sexual/physical abuse in childhood; an inability to establish appropriate social 
relationships; long-lasting discord in marriages and romantic relationships; and being 
the main suspect in a double murder for over six years. 44% of the sample had a 
history of substance abuse. 41% had a diagnosed mental health disorder. At least 8 of 
the offenders had previously tried to kill themselves, whilst many others regularly 
spoke of a desire to kill themselves.  
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26% could be characterized as socially isolated whilst 24% also lived alone at the 
time of their attack. Whilst 18% had some military experience, only 2% had 
experienced actual combat. 
 
Proximal Factors 
 
This section provides an overview of the prevalence of behaviors the individual 
engaged in very near to the mass murder. None of these behaviors are attack-related 
specifically but again provide a more holistic view of the immediate life-situation the 
offenders found themselves in just prior to planning their attack. The results again 
highlight the importance of short-term situational risk factors. Consistently across a 
number of variables, it appears these short-term risk factors appear most commonly 
for mass murderers particularly in the 6-month time frame prior to their eventual 
attack. 
 
[Table 1. Around Here]  
Attack Signaling 
 
One of the most surprising behavioral trends was the extent to which the sample 
tended to leak information to significant others regarding their attack plan (See Table 
2). Studies of similar actors have however found similar results. For example, Meloy 
et al.’s (9) study of adolescent mass murderers in North America illustrated that 44% 
of the sample discussed the act of murder with at least one other person prior to the 
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event itself. Also, 58% of the offenders in their study made threatening statements 
alluding to mass murder prior to the event and this was usually to a third-party 
audience. In 81% of Vossekuil et al.’s (17) sample of U.S.-based school shooters, at 
least one other individual had known of the offender’s intentions or specific plans for 
the school attack. In 59% of the cases, more than one non-attack related person had 
prior knowledge. Unlike Meloy et al.’s study, there was a lower rate of school 
shooters (17%) who provided specific pre-event warnings. Vossekuil et al. (17) also 
found that although most of the offenses were committed by individuals, in 44% of 
the cases the solo offender was “influenced by other individuals in deciding to mount 
an attack, dared or encouraged by others to attack, or both”. In some of these cases, 
others aided the solo offender in acquiring the weapon and/or ammunition. Finally, 
Fein and Vossekuil (14) studied individuals who committed or attempted to commit 
assassinations of public figures in the United States. They illustrate that although 
specific pre-attack warnings are a rare-event, often others close to the offender were 
either aware of his/her interest in assassinations (44%), history of verbal/written 
communications about the eventual target (77%) or history of indirect, conditional or 
direct threats concerning the eventual target (63%). 
 
The leaking of intent is therefore a key indicator to keep in mind with regards to 
countering lone actor terrorism. However, this information cannot be acted upon if the 
recipient of the leaked information does not pass this up to the relevant authorities. 
There could be a clear barrier to this information being passed on. For example, 
Borum (30) posits that “those with kinship bonds may not approve at all of the 
attacker’s intent, but they may feel restrained from acting because of love and loyalty 
or concern about the consequences”. Borum further outlines that research on such 
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reporting mechanisms shows that factors such as the presence of multiple reporting 
channels, anonymity, accessibility, safety and credibility are key to successful 
transmission of this information. Of course, not all of the instances in which 
information is received about verbalized intent are viable threats or risks so instead of 
acting straight away, the logical next step is to engage in a risk assessment and look at 
the rest of the individual’s behaviors with regard to their situation, capability, 
motivation and opportunity to act. The results in table 2 outline various ‘leakage’ 
related behaviors 
 
[Table 2. Around Here] 
 
Motivational structures are difficult to unpack with regards to mass murderers. Just 
over half (56%) held a grievance against a particular person or entity. The list of 
grievances include government-related institutions and officials, neighbors, former 
employers and co-workers (e.g. being teased for eating a chicken burrito every day at 
work), family members (e.g. for making the offender “suffer”), acquaintances (e.g. for 
selling poor quality drugs), neighbors (e.g. dog owners), service providers (e.g. 
landlord, lawyers, accountants, teachers), specific sets of the population (e.g. 
homosexuals, women, minority groups) and other vaguer categories (e.g. “rich snobs” 
who “raped my soul”, individuals involved in the “Rave” scene, Campbell Soup 
because of the level of MSG in foods, Communists, and the band Pantera who the 
offender alleged stole his lyrics). Offenders were aggrieved against the government 
due to, for example, being a former government employee, a dispute over benefits 
payments, a dispute over parking fines, a belief that the government was trying to 
control the offender using low frequency radio waves, a belief that the police were 
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framing him for a serial murder, a belief that child support payments were set too 
high, the tax office for taking too much of his earnings and a paranoid delusion that a 
“cop” was out to ruin him by breaking into his house multiple times and then touching 
him and causing him to vomit. Many offenders appeared obsessed about other issues 
unrelated to their grievance. These include obsessions with serial murderers, death, 
food additives, former girlfriends, female neighbors, celebrities, firearms, and the 
causes of ill health.  
 
Finally there are a couple of other event related behaviors that produced interesting 
results. The mass murderer sample were overwhelmingly likely to have a history of 
the attack location (79%) and this may account for why very few engaged in dry runs 
(4%). Their attacks typically took place in situations in which most of their routine 
activities also played out (e.g. work, school etc.). 85% of the plots appeared to 
preconceived and planned, not spontaneous or impulsive. Many mass murderers also 
consumed drugs or alcohol just prior to the attack (20%). 53% died at the scene of 
their attack. All but 13 of those cases were suicide, the rest being death by cop. 
Discussion 
 
On the surface, mass murder attacks seem to defy explanation. The immediate 
aftermath of both phenomena is marked by drama, panic and an inevitable search for 
simple answers. In particular, there is an unerring tendency to reach for mono-causal 
master narrative explanations. The individual actor is either deranged, unbalanced, 
unhinged, disturbed, mad, crazy, nuts and unstable, or he/she is driven by a hateful 
ideology, radicalized, politically focused, inspired by some foreign ‘entity’, or 
determined to effect some social or political upheaval or policy change. In the days 
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that follow an event such as these, the framing of the individual’s motivation usually 
takes on one of these two narratives. The chosen narrative depends upon the easy 
availability of information regarding their ideological content, mental health history 
or personal background details.  
 
Yet what we see from the analysis we offer here, mass murderer attacks are usually 
the culmination of a complex mix of personal, political and social drivers that 
crystalize at the same time to drive the individual down the path of violent action. 
Whether the violence comes to fruition is usually a combination of the availability 
and vulnerability of suitable targets that suit the heady mix of personal and political 
grievances and the individual’s capability to engage in an attack from both a 
psychological and technical capability standpoint. Many individual cases share a 
mixture of unfortunate personal life circumstances coupled with an intensification of 
beliefs/grievances that later developed into the idea to engage in violence. What 
differed was how these influences were sequenced. Sometimes personal problems led 
to a susceptibility to ideological influences. Sometimes long-held ideological 
influences became intensified after the experience of personal problems. This is why 
we should be wary of mono-causal master narratives (e.g. it was caused by mental 
illness). The development of these behaviors is usually far more labyrinthine and 
dynamic.  
 
One of the major implications this type of analysis such as this could be to provide 
guidance or a framework to those tasked with responding to such phenomena. Given 
our counter-intuitive findings on the leakage of intent, this may be particularly 
relevant in terms of early disruption of plots. An understanding of this complexity and 
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the multiplicity of potential factors could help inform how threat assessments of 
particular lone actors should be carried out. When we talk about ‘threat’, and the 
related concept of risk, we need to consider multiple, overlapping questions including 
issues related to identification of threats (e.g. threat of what precisely?), exposure (e.g. 
under what conditions are particular offences more likely?) and management (i.e. 
which interventions are likely to be effective in terms of mitigating either risk, 
broadly speaking, or a specific threat). 
 
The results highlight that the target and/or target location of the violence was usually 
associated with something to do with the individual’s personal grievance. This may 
help give us a sense of what Borum calls the ‘scenarios of exposure’ or the conditions 
under which a particular individual become a threat. The temporal issues also 
highlight the fact that we need to view risk dynamically. Given a set of circumstances 
and conditions an individual may appear to be no or low risk. However, small 
changes in their life-course, the loss of a protective factor, personal circumstances or 
opportunity to offend can have a force-multiplier effect and propel the individual into 
a higher category of risk. These issues are explored in detail by Monahan (31) who 
warns however, of the need for comparison samples (including control groups) in 
order to scientifically validate many of the otherwise working assumptions relevant to 
risk assessment. 
 
From the analysis presented in this paper, mass murderers look very similar to lone-
actor terrorists, perhaps only differing in the ratio to which they are personally versus 
politically aggrieved. They display no discernable socio-demographic profile, 
generally somebody knows something about the plot, many but not all are socially 
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isolated, they engage in a wide range of pre-crimes, and they are rarely sudden and 
impulsive. We sought to examine whether their ‘radicalization’ trajectory toward this 
act of violence was also similar. The analyses suggest that they share a lot in common 
with the results outlined in Gill et al. (11) and Gill (12). This has a multiplicity of 
implications for early detection, threat management and possibly disruption. The job 
of intelligence analysts (be it for the police or intelligence communities) often 
involves assessing the scale of an individual’s threat based on often fragmentary 
information. The analyses above do not point toward one single behavioral profile 
from which risk assessments can be built but instead provide insight for the 
development and application of structured professional judgments in these cases.   
 
Finally, the results also highlight the fact that (a) in most cases there tends to be long-
held risk factors but (b) they tend to be enabled in a force multiplier effect by much 
more recent situational stressors and that (c) the trajectory into violence tends to be a 
lengthy process. Phases may be identifiable on this process, from grievance formation 
to fixation to capacity building to attack planning. If an individual is identified ahead 
of time (say for example after leaking key information), the individual’s position in 
this pathway can be plotted, and a range of disruption/prevention tools can be 
implemented from there.  
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Table 1. Prevalence of Proximal Behaviors  
 
Variable Occurred within 2 
Years 
Occurred within 1 
Year 
Occurred within 6 
Months 
Recently Unemployed 29% 28% 23% 
Experienced Being 
Degraded 
31% 23% 17% 
Target of a Perceived 
Act of Prejudice 
23% 16% 7% 
Problems with 
Personal 
Relationships 
38% 34% 23% 
Financial Problems 25% 24% 19% 
Elevated Level of 
Stress 
56% 45% 38% 
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Table 2. Leakage & Network Related Behaviors 
 
Behavior Mass Murderer 
Other People Aware of the 
Individual's Grievance 
46% 
Made Verbal Statements to 
Friends/Family about Intent or 
Belief 
31% 
Interacted Face to Face with 
Members of a Wider Network 
7% 
At Least One Other Knew of the 
Individual's 
Research/Planning/Prep for an 
Attack 
17% 
Interacted Virtually with Members 
of a Wider Network 
3% 
Received Help in Procuring 
Weaponry 
7% 
Produced Public Statements Prior 
to the Event 
12% 
Made a Pre-Event Warning 19% 
Learnt Through Virtual Sources 10% 
Tried to Recruit Others 3% 
  
 
24 
 
